Opinions
All court opinions may be accessed at no charge via PACER through the "Written Opinions" link on the Reports page. You must, however, have an account to access the report via CM/ECF or PACER.
Access to opinions from 1997 to present, that are PDF searchable, unrestricted & unsealed, are also available through the Government Printing Office using the Advanced Search for Government Publications. There is no login required and publications are available free of charge.
Court Opinions Database
The court's provides free access of some opinions, at the discretion of the judges, for the years 1998 to present. The results shown below are automatically displayed for all years, all judges, and all keywords/topics.
A search may be performed using the Search box above, or filtering by year, judge, and/or keyword/topic. To search for more than one judge and/or keywords/topics simultaneously, hold down the Ctrl key (or Command key) and select each item.
Keywords/Topic | Date | Title | Description | Judge | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Administrative Claims, Chapter 11 | 06/08/2023 | Henry Valencia, Inc. |
Taxing authorities could claim administrative expenses for taxes incurred post-petition, pre-chapter 11 plan effective date, despite filing their claims after the general administrative expense claims bar date. Under § 503(b)(1)(D), taxing authorities are not required to file a request for payment of administrative expense as a condition to allowance of an administrative expense claim. Neither the administrative expense claims bar date order nor the confirmed plan specifically overrode § 503(b)(1)(D)’s exception. However, once property of the estate vested in the debtor on the plan effective date, no further taxes could be incurred by the estate. Consequently, because administrative tax claims are limited to taxes incurred by the estate, the Court disallowed the taxing authorities’ claim for administrative expenses incurred on or after the plan effective date.
|
Chief Judge Robert H. Jacobvitz | |
Chapter 11, Confirmation, Dismissal or Conversion, Subchapter V | 03/15/2023 | S-Tek 1, LLC |
In a subchapter V case, after denial of confirmation of Debtor’s plan of reorganization and while a creditor’s motion to convert or dismiss the bankruptcy case was under advisement, Debtor filed another plan and a motion to establish confirmation procedures. In the alternative, Debtor asked the Court to approve a structured dismissal. First, the Court observed that Debtor had the right to file preconfirmation plan modifications and treated its preconfirmation amended plans as plan modifications. Second, the Court rejected Debtor’s contention that subchapter V imposes no time limit after denial of confirmation to file a new plan. Third, the Court observed that although a subchapter V debtor may need an extension of time under the stricter standard set forth in § 1189(b) to file another plan following denial of confirmation, the Court did not need to decide the issue. Instead, the Court applied the more liberal standard adopted by courts in chapter 12 cases for granting additional time to file another plan following denial of confirmation and ruled that Debtor would not be given time to file another plan. The Court explained that Debtor had a full and fair opportunity to seek confirmation of its plan, the case had been pending for almost two years, the parties had incurred enormous legal fees, and the new plan was basically an attempt to correct evidentiary gaps in the confirmation hearing already held. Fourth, the Court found that “cause” existed to convert or dismiss the chapter 11 case. Fifth, the Court denied Debtor’s request that the Court approve a structured dismissal because it was not feasible. Debtor intended to continue operating the business, but Debtor’s secured creditor could foreclose its lien on any accounts receivable that Debtor generated. The Court found that Debtor could not protect the receivables by granting a purchase money lien. Finally, the Court found that it was in the best interests of creditors and the estate to convert the case to chapter 7 instead of dismissing the case. The Court relied in making that decision on the secured creditor’s agreement to a chapter 7 carve-out.
|
Chief Judge Robert H. Jacobvitz | |
Attorneys Fees, Chapter 11 | 02/06/2023 | S-Tek 1, LLC |
The United States Trustee and the Subchapter V Trustee objected to Debtor’s counsel’s fee application, arguing that the requested fees were not reflective of the results obtained. Debtor’s proposed chapter 11 plan proposed to pay attorney’s anticipated allowed unpaid fees of $210,00 in full at the rate of $5,000 per month while unsecured non-priority creditors would receive only $45,000 over five years. Debtor pursued an adversary proceeding that had the potential to eliminate its primary creditor’s claim and generate substantial funds for the estate, but the litigation was not successful. Had Debtor not pursued the litigation, Debtor’s business would have ceased and unsecured priority and non-priority creditors would have received nothing. The Court determined that under Tenth Circuit precedent, it was required to apply the Johnson factors, including the “results obtained” factor, as well as the § 330 factors to assess the reasonableness of requested fees. However, “results obtained” is only one factor, and the Court in its discretion may give whatever weight to that factor it deems appropriate under the circumstances of the case. In exercising its discretion, the Court determined after applying the §330 and Johnson factors that counsel’s fees should be allowed in the amount requested. Under the circumstances, where Debtor’s only viable alternative was to pursue the litigation in its effort to propose a plan that would provide a dividend to unsecured creditors, the attorney’s decision to perform the services was reasonable and appropriate when the services were rendered. The “results obtained” included getting a decision on the merits of the adversary proceeding, which all parties agreed had to be resolved before the Court could hold a confirmation hearing, and valuation of the primary secured creditor’s collateral. Even though Debtor did not “win” the litigation, the litigation was of importance to the administration of the estate.
|
Chief Judge Robert H. Jacobvitz | |
Chapter 11, Confirmation | 02/06/2023 | S-Tek 1, LLC |
The Court considered whether to confirm Debtor’s third plan of reorganization pursuant to § 1191(b), which governs non-consensual subchapter V plans. Under the plan, to defeat a creditor’s § 1111(b) election, Debtor proposed surrendering and replacing all or substantially all of the creditor’s collateral, which included the equipment and vehicles Debtor used to operate its business and most of its cash and accounts receivable. The Court found that Debtor failed to show it would have the financial ability to replace surrendered assets necessary for it to maintain its operations. Therefore, the Court denied plan confirmation for failure to meet the feasibility requirements of § 1129(a)(11) and § 1191(c)(3), made applicable by § 1191(b). |
Chief Judge Robert H. Jacobvitz | |
Administrative Claims, Breach of Contract, Chapter 11 | 01/12/2023 | Henry Valencia, Inc. |
Claimants and Debtor entered into a post-petition oral agreement for repair to claimants’ van. Claimants filed an application for administrative expense based on Debtor’s alleged improper repair and damage to their van while in Debtor’s possession. The Court determined that damages arising from a breach of a post-petition contract made in the ordinary course of a chapter 11 debtor’s business operations can constitute an administrative expense claim under § 503. Claimants did not meet their burden of proving that Debtor breached the oral contract’s implied warranty to use reasonable skill to complete the repairs, but established that Debtor breached the implied warranty to complete repairs within a reasonable time, entitling claimants to an allowed administrative expense for loss of use damages equal to the cost of renting a vehicle for the unreasonable period of delay, less the amount to be charged for repairs under the oral agreement to repair the van.
|
Chief Judge Robert H. Jacobvitz | |
Chapter 11, Relief from Judgment | 01/06/2023 | Michael Jacques Jacobs |
Debtor sought relief under Rule 59(e) from the Court’s order dismissing debtor’s chapter 11 case. The Court dismissed debtor’s case for “cause” under § 1111(b), concluding that debtor’s plan impermissibly modified the secured creditor’s claim, which was secured solely by debtor’s principle residence, in violation of § 1123(b)(5)’s anti-modification prohibition. Although some case law supports debtor’s position, the Court already considered those cases in ruling on the motion to dismiss or convert, and determined as a matter of law that debtor was required to pay all pre-confirmation arrears in full by the plan effective date in order to satisfy the anti-modification prohibition of § 1123(b)(5). Debtor’s alleged errors in the court’s findings of fact would not have changed the result; debtor’s arguments regarding “indubitable equivalent” are not relevant to whether debtor’s plan was facially unconfirmable under § 1123(b)(5); and debtor’s remaining arguments did not meet the standard for Rule 59(e) relief.
|
Chief Judge Robert H. Jacobvitz | |
Cause, Chapter 11, Dismissal or Conversion, Principal Residence | 10/14/2022 | Michael Jacques Jacobs |
“Cause” existed under § 1112(b) to dismiss or convert individual debtor’s chapter 11 case because debtor’s plan, filed more than two and a half years after debtor commenced the bankruptcy case, did not comply with the Code’s requirements for treatment of a claim secured only by debtor’s principal residence. To determine whether a plan violates the anti-modification prohibition in § 1123(b)(5) applicable to claims secured only by a debtor’s principal residence, the Court must look to the impairment provisions in § 1124. To “unimpair” a claim under § 1124(2), a debtor must cure all pre- and post-petition, pre-confirmation arrearages by the plan effective date. Consequently, a chapter 11 individual debtor may not cure arrearages on a claim secured only by the debtor’s principal residence by making installment payments over time. Such treatment impermissibly modifies the secured creditor’s claim in violation of § 1123(b)(5). Debtor’s plan did not provide for a cure of all arrearages by the plan effective date in violation of § 1123(b)(5)’s anti-modification prohibition, and Debtor did not rebut the showing of “cause” by demonstrating unusual circumstances or a likelihood that he would be able to confirm a plan within a reasonable time. The Court determined that dismissal was in the best interest of creditors and the estate and dismissed the case.
|
Chief Judge Robert H. Jacobvitz | |
Chapter 11, Injunctions | 09/19/2022 | S-Tek 1, LLC v. Surv-Tek, Inc. |
Debtor and guarantors filed a motion for temporary restraining order (“TRO”) requesting the Court to enjoin collection efforts against non-debtor guarantors until the final hearing on confirmation of Debtor’s chapter 11 plan. The plan contained a temporary injunction that would enjoin the creditor’s collection efforts against non-debtor third-party guarantors while Debtor made plan payments. The Court held a final evidentiary hearing on short notice and treated the request for TRO as a motion for preliminary injunction. After determining that it has authority to approve a temporary plan injunction, the Court reviewed the various tests courts apply to determine whether to approve such an injunction and then applied a modified traditional injunction standard. The Court concluded that it would not approve the proposed temporary plan injunction and therefore would not grant a preconfirmation injunction as a bridge to the plan injunction. The Court found that Debtor’s proposed plan would satisfy at most about one-third of the guaranteed obligation, the creditor’s sole recourse to recover the balance is to enforce the unsecured third-party guaranty, and there is a reasonable likelihood of irreparable harm to the creditor if the Court granted the requested injunctive relief. The Court ruled that the injunction should not issue even if it meant that Debtor would be unable to confirm a plan.
|
Chief Judge Robert H. Jacobvitz | |
Chapter 11, Proof of Claim | 01/18/2022 | S-Tek 1, LLC |
Debtor sought to strike an amended proof of claim filed after the claims bar date which substituted the named creditor. The Court denied the motion, determining that the claim was properly amended to substitute the name of the correct creditor and related back to the date of the filing of the original claim where 1) the original claim gave Debtor adequate notice of the existence, nature, and amount of the claim, 2) except for the name of the creditor, the amended claim did not materially change the original claim, 3) the creditor filing the amended claim bore a substantial relationship to the original claimant inasmuch as both creditors where wholly owned by the same two individuals, and the same counsel represented both creditors and filed the proof of claim and the amended claim, 4) the mistaken identity of the claimant in the original claim should have been obvious to the Debtor for a variety of reasons; and 5) the amendment did not prejudice the Debtor or other creditors.
|
Chief Judge Robert H. Jacobvitz | |
Chapter 11, Confirmation | 12/09/2021 | S-Tek 1, LLC |
A separately classified undersecured creditor making the § 1111(b) election to treat its entire claim as secured does not automatically forfeit its right to vote its secured claim. If its secured claim is impaired under the plan, such creditor making the § 1111(b) election may vote its impaired secured claim to accept or reject the debtor’s plan and only relinquishes its right to vote what would otherwise be its unsecured deficiency claim. |
Chief Judge Robert H. Jacobvitz |